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Abstract. For proper knowledge management, organizations must consider how knowledge is
kept and reused. The term organizational memory is due for an overhaul. Memory appears to
be everywhere in organizations; yet, the term has been limited to only a few uses. Based on an
ethnographic study of a telephone hotline group, this paper presents a micro-level, distributed
cognition analysis of two hotline calls, the work activity surrounding the calls, and the
memory used in the work activity. Drawing on the work of Star, Hutchins, and Strauss, the
paper focuses on issues of applying past information for current use. Our work extends
Strauss’ and Hutchins’ trajectories to get at the understanding of potential future use by
participants and its role in current information storage. We also note the simultaneously
shared provenance and governance of multiple memories – human and technical. This analysis
and the theoretical framework we construct should be to be useful in further efforts in
describing and analyzing organizational memory within the context of knowledge manage-
ment efforts.
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1. Introduction
Central to knowledge management efforts is reuse – of explicit information,
tacit knowledge, or lessons learned – within an organization. Intuitively, the
reuse of previously stored information, or organizational memory, is critical
to the success of modern organizations. Yet much remains unanswered about
organizational memory. We know relatively little about, for example:
• How do organizations, as collectivities of people, remember and forget?
• Where do knowledge-based organizations store information to be re-
used? What does it even mean for an organization to ‘‘store’’ informa-
tion? How are people part of that ‘‘stored’’ information?
• How are memories accrued, located, and then used?
• How is information abandoned?
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These are all areas of significant practical and theoretical merit.
If CSCW as a research area wishes to construct organizational memory
systems as part of knowledge management in the context of organizational
life, developing the ability to theorize at an appropriate level (Strauss, 1991)
will be required to guide efforts. Theoretical conceptions of organizational
memory, however, are due for an overhaul. The term organizational mem-
ory has been unnecessarily restricted to only a few uses centered around
particular technologies; yet, memory appears to be everywhere in organiza-
tions.
Accordingly, we wish to step back in this paper and reexamine organi-
zational memory to find suitable underlying theoretical constructions.1 Our
intent is not (yet) to create technological organizational memory systems.
Instead our goal is to examine and to understand where memory exists within
an organizational setting.
The major portion of this paper consists of a detailed analysis of two
hotline calls, progressively describing each call and the work activity sur-
rounding the call. We found our field site, a telephone helpline for personnel
issues, a particularly useful domain for studying organizational memory;
largely because the repetition of questions and answers facilitated our
observation and recognition of particular patterns. A descriptive examina-
tion, rooted in an organizational field study, that allows both a micro-scale
analysis along with a theoretical development is most likely to be useful to
later system construction. Accordingly, we necessarily have restricted our
examination to a very small scale of operation because of the detail required.
We approach this examination from distributed cognition theory (Rogers,
1992; Halverson, 1995; Hutchins, 1995), described below, because its theo-
retical language spans the diverse manifestations of organizational memory –
from private to public and small scale to large.
The paper begins with a brief synopsis of the organizational memory
literature and its need for empirically-based analyses of organizational
memory. The next sections provide a brief introduction to distributed cog-
nition theory. We follow this with a description of our field site and ethno-
graphic data collection. As mentioned, the majority of the paper is an
explication of two hotline calls along with the construction of an appropriate
set of theoretical concepts. As with most ethnographically-based studies, the
explication of the data and the findings are interwoven in the paper. The
paper concludes with general implications for organizational memory re-
search and a look at future research directions.
2. Organizational memory
Organizational memory, while it serves as an entry point for considerations
of knowledge management has many varying, and occasionally competing,
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definitions in the literature. As will be seen below, few of the literature’s
definitions and conjectures, to date, rest on empirical examinations of
organizational memory within a context of use.
There have been repeated calls for empirical studies.2 Walsh and Ungson
(1991), for example, note that:
Despite the general use of the term organizational memory, it is not clear
that we have understood the concept or its implications for the manage-
ment of organizations. To date, a myriad of unexamined conjectures has
defined a concept that has even served as a basis for prescriptive
management advice. (pp. 84–85)
Studies of organizational memory fall into three groups. The first are theo-
retical studies, providing a general description of memory at the organiza-
tional level. Generally, papers theorizing about organizational memory also
theorize at a very grand scale, not relying on empirical data. They are often
founded on a March and Simon model of organizations as information
processors using search (March and Simon, 1958). For example, Stein and
Zwass (1995) argued that the organization uses its mnemonic functions to
attain its goals; no detailed examination of how this is accomplished was
provided. Huber (1990) argues that organizational learning and memory
support would be useful, but the paper does not distinguish clearly what
constitutes organizational memory. Smith (1994) uses a similar model. At a
similar level, Sandoe and Olfman (1992) examined how remembering and
forgetting might be useful organizational mechanisms, and Jennex and Olf-
man (2002) investigated the efficacy of organizational memory systems.
The second set of organizational memory studies has examined the use of
particular computer systems designed to augment an organization’s memory.
Most such studies have largely focused on the technology systems designed to
replace human and paper-based memory systems. For example, Ackerman
studied the Answer Garden system in a series of technical studies (Ackerman
and Malone, 1990; Ackerman, 1993) and field studies (Ackerman, 1996).
Answer Garden attempted to ‘‘grow’’ an organizational memory by pro-
viding a way to augment an information database and help facility. As users
asked questions about their work or other tasks, the experts who answered
them could add the questions and their answers to the information database,
thus growing the organizational memory in a manner useful to the organi-
zational members. A redesign of Answer Garden, based on additional case
studies of information seeking (Ackerman and Palen, 1996), was reported in
Ackerman and McDonald (1996) and Ackerman and Starr (1996).
Similarly, Conklin examined the use of his Corporate Memory design
rationale system in Conklin and Begeman (1988) and Conklin (1992).
Morrison and Weiser in a series of papers (Morrison, 1993; Morrison and
Weiser, 1996) examined the use of a project memory system called Team-
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Memory, and Mandviwalla et al. (1995) studied collaborative writing as a
form of organizational memory. Other systems, such as Grassroots (Kamiya
et al., 1996), have also been built and are being studied. Commercially, Lotus
Notes has been a successful technology for constructing organizational
knowledge, and Intranet uses of the World Wide Web are now heavily de-
ployed. Recently, Robinson et al. (2000) examined the use of a work ‘‘diary’’
in a factory setting (a paper mill). They uncovered the use of asynchronous
‘‘remark-aloud’’ behavior, similar to that on a trading floor or communica-
tion facility, where one worker remarks on a problem or issue for later use.
These studies of specific systems have been limited. They often rely on
narrow definitions of organizational memory or organizational tasks. More
importantly, examining particular systems, often prototypes, brings a con-
comitant difficulty in theoretical generalization.
The third set of organizational memory studies examines the use of
organizational memory through fine-grained, field-based empirical studies.
Although these would be the most useful for both designing systems and for
understanding the nuances of practice, relatively few such studies exist. In
one study, Hughes and King (1992) examined the use of paperwork in an
accounting office. They found that the organizational members used paper-
work to account for the work accomplished so far. Other studies of paper
artifacts have found similar uses for paper. Sacks (1994), in an organizational
ethnography, examined organizational learning among software engineers;
he found that his study participants learned from other engineers, not the
code itself. Orlikowski (1992) noted the importance of incentives for infor-
mation reuse in her Lotus Notes field site. Many studies (e.g., Suchman and
Wynn, 1984; Cicourel, 1990; Bannon and Bødker, 1997; Constant et al.,
1994) echo these findings; they suggest that use of information is extremely
nuanced, exception handling is the norm, and social arrangements are criti-
cal.
Despite these foundational studies, there has been little follow-on to the
carefully detailed, field-based, empirically-grounded analyses upon which to
base either theory or system design. In this paper we focus on theoretical
development based on such an analysis. We agree with Bannon and Kuutti
(1996) that despite the conceptual problems, there is something arresting
about the idea that an organization can remember. They state:
. . . that such a concept is appealed to across a wide range of studies, even if
its definition is disputed, is testimony to the fact that even if people cannot
agree on what exactly the term means, there must be some set of issues that
can be subsumed under its umbrella that people feel are important and
worth discussing. (pp. 156–157)
The relative dearth of empirical examinations specifically about organiza-
tional memory is unfortunate. The need for systematic work to examine
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organizational memory is even more pressing than for many other organi-
zational concepts. Organizational memory as a concept lends itself to a
number of theoretical problems. Relying on an mistaken characterization of
how individual memory works propagates the disservice when applied to
groups and organizations. Organizations are hardly a single, unified entity, as
the metaphor implies, nor is their memory. Furthermore, organizational
memory, as a collective function, must also be socially constructed, main-
tained, and driven.
Organizational memory as a theoretical concept, then, should be groun-
ded in studies within organizational field settings; that is, within a context of
everyday use. With such a basis, system construction can be instituted upon
these empirically-determined insights – instead of just building systems
blindly. Indeed, others (Hughes et al., 1995; Bannon and Kuutti, 1996) have
strongly argued that more empirical field-based studies are required to
understand organizational memory.
In the next section we introduce distributed cognition theory, explain why
we think it is useful, and outline how to go about an analysis that includes
tasks, individuals, technologies, and social arrangements.
3. Distributed cognition theory and analysis
Organizational memory is a messy problem. Instead of clear-cut mechanisms
making it easy to map the real world to some theoretical expectations we see
contradictions or border cases in any carefully detailed field study. To find a
deeply grounded theoretical coherence, we needed come to terms with all the
convergent and divergent observations. When we first began looking at this
data, we were struck by similarities with Halverson’s work with air traffic
controllers (Halverson, 1995) and Hutchins’ work with large ship navigation
(Hutchins, 1995). These similarities, coupled with the obvious cognitive as-
pects of talking about memory, led us to look at Hutchins’ distributed cog-
nition theory for our analysis.
Distributed cognition theory (Hutchins, 1995; Hollan et al., 2000), de-
scribed below, has a theoretical language that can span the diverse mani-
festations of organizational memory – from private to public and small scale
to large. Both based in, and reacting to, cognitive science’s characterization
of cognition as computation, and anthropology’s emphases on culture, dis-
tributed cognition theory serves as a useful conceptual framework for the
analysis of human organizational systems. To explain why we find this theory
so useful for examining organizational memory we will first outline the basic
theoretical constructs and then discuss what this means for studying orga-
nizational memory. Moving from the theoretical to the practical, we intro-
duce the methods, our setting, and outline the scope of the analysis.
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3.1. COGNITION IS DISTRIBUTED
In the last two decades there has been a growing recognition that removing
human behavior from its surrounding environment carries with it as many
dangers as advantages. This has been true in a number of fields, including
CSCW (Suchman, 1987). Since the mid 1990s there has been a parallel rec-
ognition in cognitive science that cognition is more fruitfully viewed as dis-
tributed, rather than assuming that it is the property of only an individual
mind (Salomon, 1993; Hutchins, 1995; Clark, 1997).
Several researchers have used the term distributed to mark this difference
in perspective from more traditional approaches to cognitive science
(Hutchins, 1991; Norman, 1991; Cole and Engeström, 1993; Salomon, 1993;
Hutchins and Klausen, 1996). How cognition is distributed varies by the
circumstances and the researcher. At the same time there is increasing rec-
ognition that societies and organizations have cognitive properties that are
different from those of individuals.
We focus on the theory of distributed cognition developed by Hutchins
beginning in the mid-80s, published in his book (1995) and continuing today
(Hollan et al., 2000). As a term, distributed cognition refers to the perspective
that cognition occurs in a distributed manner. Distributed cognition theory is
concerned with the organization and operation of cognitive systems; that is,
with the mechanisms that make up cognitive processes, which result in
cognitive accomplishments. Furthermore, it re-situates cognition in the socio-
cultural context.
As Hutchins (1995) points out there were many costs when cognitive
science set aside history, culture, context and emotion from the study of
cognition. One mistakes the properties of the system for those of the indi-
vidual, putting too much focus on the boundary between the individual and
everything else. In turn ‘‘when one commits to the notion that all intelligence
is inside the inside/outside boundary, one is forced to cram inside everything
that is required to produce the observed behaviors’’ (p. 355). Instead dis-
tributed cognition takes the position that ‘‘a process is not cognitive simply
because it happens in a brain, nor is a process non-cognitive simply because it
happens in the interactions among many brains.’’ (Hollan et al., 2000, p. 175)
This opens up our notions of cognitive processes to a much wider variety of
mechanisms than classic symbol manipulation (Newell and Simon, 1972;
Simon, 1990). This is one of the two key theoretical commitments that define
distributed cognition.
A second and related tenant of distributed cognition is its commitment to
a unit of analysis defined in relation to the complex phenomena being ob-
served. In Cognition in the Wild (Hutchins, 1995), Hutchins shows the
information processing in a navigation team varies with the context and
circumstances. Solo watch standing involves one individual in structured
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interaction with various artifacts via well-established procedures and rou-
tines. In contrast, entering a harbor is a high-tempo activity that requires the
effort of several people coordinating with specialized tools and each other.
While the overall functional behavior exhibited by the system is the same,
that is safe navigation of the ship, the means change.
The power of these two tenets, taken together, is extremely useful for
studying how organizational memory really happens in organizations. Dis-
tributed cognition gives us a way to approach the processes concerned with
information use, while still considering that the specifics of how information
is represented, and where it is represented, might affect the outcomes of both
storing and retrieving information. There are three basic interactions that
involve the distribution of cognitive processes and affect the phenomena of
organizational memory. These are the distributions of cognitive process (a)
between internal and external representations, (b) through time, and (c)
across members of a group. In the sections below we discuss each of these.
3.1.1. Coordination of cognitive processing between internal and external
representational states
When the unit of analysis is widened to include other observable cognitive
agents we become more aware of how representations are coordinated among
agents and across boundaries. Cognitive processing necessarily requires
processing that is both internal and external to individuals, as well as some
artifacts.
For example, Hutchins deeply analyzes the socio-cultural–technical sys-
tem of navigation aboard a large military vessel. Building on Simon’s con-
ception that problem solving is re-representing the problem until the solution
becomes transparent, Hutchins lays out how the cognitive computation of
the system solving the ‘‘problem’’ of navigation can be detailed. As he states:
‘‘The fix cycle3 is accomplished by the propagation of representational state
across a series of representational media. The representations of the position
of the ship take different forms in the different media as they make their way
from the sighting telescopes of the alidades to the chart.’’ (Hutchins, 1995, p.
117) That propagation requires the careful coordination of information
among individuals and artifacts so that the representational state being
propagated is meaningful.
3.1.2. Temporally distributed cognitive processes
Culture is a process that accumulates partial solutions to frequently
encountered problems. (Hollan et al., 2000, p. 178).
Cognition is distributed through time in such a way that the products of
earlier events transform the nature of later events. Culturally defined
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routines, such as a routine about the ‘‘right way’’ to do something, are
examples of this. Artifacts can also embed a history of their use. For
example, a ruler is marked with lines that have meaning that affect their
current use. Saying that a piece of paper is 8½ by 11 in. assumes that the
measurement, as well as the number system is meaningful to both the speaker
and the hearer. That meaning is based on their previous use and the history
of how those markers came to have meaning with respect to socially agreed
measurements. The artifact of the ruler then serves as a way to save and carry
forward a solution to the problem of measurement. In some cases the solu-
tion is more specific, for example, in the specialized artifacts for navigation,
such as the Mercator projection (Hutchins, 1995), which helps solve certain
kinds of navigation problems.
Both the ruler and the map show one way that artifacts, which save and
carry forward a partial solution, can affect the process of an event far re-
moved in time. To be successful however, such artifacts are knit together with
the mechanisms of current social practice. In the case of a well-defined
problem like navigation, where the parameters that are important have been
well understood for over a century, the social practice has been routinized
and carried forward with the artifact. Thus, contextualizing the artifact
(which is necessary for its use) has been carried forward with it in time.
One possible inference is that this embedding of solutions in artifacts and
their accompanying practice is only possible where systems are usually
solving repetitive well-defined problems such as ship navigation (Hutchins,
1988, 1995), and aviation (Hutchins, 1995; Hutchins and Klausen, 1996).
Such problems are often complicated but well structured. In addition, the
repetition means that the high cost of proceduralizing and embedding the
solution in an artifact is well worth the effort. However, these kinds of
solutions also happen on a local scale, as Halverson observed in air traffic
control (Halverson, 1995; Halverson and Ackerman, 2003). One easily rec-
ognizable example is so-called cheat sheets, such as the phone list of a work
group or notes on how to back up files to a shared file system. In these cases
the problem to be solved is repetitive and well-defined within a very localized
setting (perhaps only one individual) and over a comparatively short time
span.
3.1.3. Socially distributed cognition
The application of these abilities must be ‘‘organized’’ in the sense that the
work done by each component ability must be coordinated with that done
by others. (Hutchins, 1995, p. 154)
Cognitive processing can be distributed across members of a group as well. If
artifacts act as repositories, encoding partial solutions to problems, then how
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might the cognitive properties of a group differ from those of an individual?
Hutchins points out that since Durkheim at the turn of the last century there
have been largely programmatic assertions that groups might have cognitive
properties differing from those of an individual. Roberts (1964) began to
demonstrate how such properties might be manifested at the individual and
group levels. Roberts suggested, as Hutchins notes, ‘‘that a cultural group
can be seen as a kind of widely distributed memory. Such a memory is clearly
more robust than the memory of any individual and undoubtedly has a much
greater capacity.’’ (Hutchins, 1995, p. 177) Roberts studied four American
Indian tribes and compared their ability at information retrieval at the tribal
level, linking the observed properties to particular features of group orga-
nization. Hutchins builds on this by discussing how both communication and
learning processes differ between individuals and groups involved with the
navigation of a ship.
Hutchins argues that different social organizations help a system solve
different sorts of problems. Furthermore, the organization, for example of
the team and artifacts used to navigate, can change in response to the
changing needs of the system. Thus, while existing social structure may
proscribe the path of certain processes it does not restrict potential paths
completely. The ‘‘cognitive accomplishments of any two groups might de-
pend entirely on differences in the social organization of distributed cognition
and not at all on differences in the cognitive properties of individuals in the
two groups.’’ Hutchins explores this further by investigating the difference
between learning at an individual and organizational level.
Our observations resonated with many of Hutchins’ findings. As we dis-
cuss below, organizational memory is necessarily distributed through time
and across not only group members, but groups. In addition, a distributed
cognition analysis exposes the coordination necessary between representa-
tional states that we found critical for day-to-day operations.
3.2. METHODS FOR DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS
It is one thing to talk about observing the coordination of representational
media, but what does that mean in terms of data collection and analysis? In
this section, we discuss how the theoretical stance affects both methods and
analysis.
3.2.1. Analysis
To begin, distributed cognition theory frames the problem in terms of
examining a cognitive system in terms of its functions. The first task in a
distributed cognition analysis is to identify how a functional system works,
good and bad (Rogers, 1992). There are low-level functional systems often
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embedded in larger functional systems that contribute to the overall activity
being observed. Functional operation is decomposed into smaller units of
analysis that make sense with respect to the particular system. While
appearing in some cases to be straightforward task decomposition, it is more
essentially an event driven segmentation.
As with other cognitive theories, distributed cognition identifies the ob-
served informational inputs entering, as well as those outputs leaving, a
system. The functional definition of the unit of analysis helps with this
identification. Stepping down in grain size, inside the system the focus is
about how information is represented, and how these representations are
transformed, combined, and propagated through that system in order to
produce the system’s observable behavior (Simon, 1990). It is the detailing of
representational states and processes that helps the analyst to understand
much of the system processing as it involves transitions between humans and
artifacts. One records the representational state, the material media on which
it is instantiated, as well as the processes that transform it. Video recording is
particularly helpful here because of the ability to review the record repeti-
tively and glean details that are observable but difficult to catch in just ‘‘one-
pass’’.
Thinking of organizations as cognitive systems is not new, of course. What
is new is the examination of the role of the material media in which
representations are embodied, and in the physical processes that propagate
representations across media. Applying the cognitive science approach to a
larger unit of analysis requires attention to the details of these processes as
they are enacted in the activities of real persons interacting with real
material media. (Hutchins, 1995, p. 266)
The common breakdown into representational states and processes provides
a way to analyze how the observed details achieve the particular function that
is the focus of a unit of analysis. This presents artifacts, human actors, and
organizational and social structures on an equal theoretical footing. With a
description constructed in these terms we can begin to understand how
technologies and social structures currently fit a system’s operation.
Once analyzed into its component representational states and processes,
the analyst uses that information to reconstruct the functioning of the sys-
tem. This allows an analysis with respect to the context of use within an
organization. By extension one can speculate about how changes in tech-
nologies might affect future operations. We believe that looking at the phe-
nomena of organizational memory is well supported by taking this essentially
cognitive view of a system, and in our interpretation, giving it a certain social
twist. However, before discussing how distributed cognition can be applied to
a specific organizational memory, we must first present the details of the field
setting.
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4. Setting and data collection
This study is based on field observations of a telephone hotline group (called
HLG here) at a well-established company, CyberCorp, headquartered in
Silicon Valley. HLG answers human resource questions for CyberCorp,
primarily about benefits and personnel policies for the company’s thousands
of employees. In general, telephone hotlines are of interest in the study of
organizational memory, largely because they are so information intensive.
HLG agents have to start forming their answer within 45–60 s while simul-
taneously listening to the caller’s elaborations and information. Many an-
swers came directly from the hotline member’s memory; hotline questions
tend to be repetitive. There is also a great need for additional information
sources: Facts must be double-checked, new questions arise, and answers
become obsolete with new conditions.
The field study took place over a period of 18 months. A variety of data
collection methods were used, including direct observation, video, semi-
structured interviews, and social network analyses. Here we describe and
analyze the responses to two calls captured on video. Both calls involve
Joan4. Joan was an experienced agent, having been at CyberCorp for five
years and at HLG for one year.
Because of privacy reasons, only one side of the conversations was taped.
Joan, however, described each call fully to the camera. (Moreover, we are
concerned here with Joan’s actions, rather than the intent of the caller.)
Throughout, Joan appeared to be natural and relaxed.
Joan and the other agents work in cubicles that are open to a central
corridor (Figure 1). Like many control room settings (e.g. Seifert and
Hutchins, 1992), the cubicles are close enough to easily hear the activities of
other agents. Her chair faces away from the corridor between the cubicles.
This arrangement is important for accomplishing her work.
Each agent has two monitors, where she uses a number of software
packages. The telephone to the right of her monitors is another computa-
tional system that plays a role in the work. These computational systems and




Figure 1. Joan’s workplace. The left-hand portion shows how the cubicles are related to each other,
as well as the shared terminals. The right is a larger picture of Joan’s office.
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4.1. APPLYING DISTRIBUTED COGNITION TO HLG
Like other functional human systems, HLG has the property that many of
the system properties are directly observable. We can bound the portion of
the system to be analyzed, based on the observed function and initially its
temporal limits. Within this unit, we expose information about the task, its
resources, and organization.
In the case of HLG, the cognitive system’s purpose is to answer or solve the
caller’s problem. The caller can be seen as the input to this system, and her question
is a representational state traveling via the material media of the phone to one of
the HLG agents. For each call the unit of consideration may vary. We might
initially bound the system to include the caller, Joan, the telephone, and other
materials (or resources) available to Joan. While her use of the telephone is an
indicator of where the process is occurring, it does not completely define the limits
of the task. In general, physical, resource, and temporal limits bound the functional
system observed at any point in time. In the analyses that follow some calls are
bounded temporally from when the receiver is picked up to when it is set down, a
matter of a few minutes. In other cases, the temporal extent is considerably longer
but the extent is framed by the focus on the solution of a single problem.
In the case of HLG, a distributed cognition analysis highlights how the
work of the system is organized and reorganized to meet changing needs. A
plethora of information is available in HLG. In some cases the required
information is easily accessible, while in others it must be located or
uncovered. In any case, information must be monitored, managed, and
communicated in order to do the job. The details of this information use
form the basis for our description and analysis.
In the remainder of the paper we will present the results of the analysis. We
present the analysis of two HLG telephone calls. (We observed at least 300
calls, taped approximately 60, and chose 10 for analysis in a manner similar to
Hutchins and Palen (1993) and Halverson (1995).) Both of the calls presented
here are necessarily simple. Space limitations prevent us from presenting
longer calls, but more importantly, even simple calls turn out to be surprisingly
complex and rich when fully analyzed. Indeed, we selected these specific calls
to best show the organization and function of organizational memory, as these
simple calls are easier to explain but still involve the same underlying issues.
5. Correcting a database entry
Below is a transcript from videotape of an HLG call. A walkthrough of this
call will begin to unpack the working of organizational memory. We
reproduce and discuss the beginning of this call at length; later, we will
summarize sections of the call to be more concise. Because of privacy rea-
sons, only one side of the exchange was taped.
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5.1. ANSWERING THE PHONE
The first four turns of the call are routine, but even so they demonstrate
critical aspects of the organization’s memory. The call begins with a routine
set of conversational markers, Joan’s standard opening (Drew and Heritage,
1992). Turn 1 consists of Joan greeting the caller, and acknowledging that the
caller was forced to hold for some period of time. While the telephone system
automatically routed a call to her as soon as she finished the previous call, the
caller was forced to wait for an available agent. Turn 2 acknowledges the
caller’s request. In this case an employee has called because a benefits pro-
vider does not show her as receiving their benefit. This benefits provider, Eye
and Vision Associates (EVA), will not process the employee’s claim (or ra-
ther, allow the employee to purchase eyeglasses at a discount) until this is
corrected.
The employee says that she called EVA directly and that EVA did not show
her as having coverage. Joan must then check whether the employee, Michelle,
actually showed coverage within the CARL database: This database, built from
payroll data, shows the employee benefits for each employee in CyberCorp.
At the end of turn 2, Joan starts a new call-tracking record in the CAT
(CAll Tracking) system for the new call, closing out the old one that she had
not quite finished. Turn 3 is more complex, as Joan does several things
simultaneously. She asks for the relevant information, namely the caller’s
employee number. Joan has now opened a new CAT record for the call and
checked the employee phone list for the caller. She double-checks the em-
ployee’s social security number for later use with the CARL database. As she
is confirming the employee information with the caller, Michelle, she is also
typing the information into the call-tracking record. She also writes
Michelle’s social security number on a piece of scrap paper, because she must
go to the CARL terminal to look up the employee data. When she is finished
obtaining and double-checking this information, she asks Michelle to hold,
knowing that the next step will take a minute or two.
1 HR Helpline. This is Joan. Thanks for holding. (Joan nods slowly to
herself.)
2 You called EVA directly? I’ll find out what our system shows for you. Oh I
see. Oh, so right, right ... yeah .... (Encouragingly) Let me do this. (In an
aside tone) The system is being very slow, so it’ll take a second to get a new
record up for you.
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At the end of turn 4, Joan goes to the CARL terminal, which is physically
in another location behind her cubicle. (There are separate terminals for two
different employee databases, and part of Joan’s routine is selecting the
correct database.) She types, looking at the piece of scrap paper, and pulls up
the appropriate record. This takes 23 s. After obtaining the data, she visibly
pauses and stares abstractedly at the ceiling.
5.2. MANY SMALL MEMORIES
We will proceed with the rest of the call below, but even the first four turns
show many cognitive, social, and institutional arrangements in the organi-
zation’s memory. In her execution Joan uses not one monolithic memory, as
many technocentric models would have it. Instead, she uses many small
memories.
To reframe, the call was triggered by the telephone system’s short-term
memory of the group’s activity. The system state shows that Joan’s station is
free, and the call falls to her. Hearing the caller’s information, Joan uses her
own memory as she then types that information into the CAT record. (For
convenience, other uses of Joan’s memory are omitted here.)
Joan then takes the information in CAT and reproduces it onto a piece of
paper, creating a mobile form of memory. She appears not trust to her own
memory, but resorts to something that can help her reconstruct the cir-
cumstances of the call. She then types the information from the paper into
the CARL system. CARL is a typical type of organizational memory, a
corporate database with employee records. Joan places the CARL output
onto the paper again.
Within just these three turns, Joan has used three separate software sys-
tems (CAT, the telephone system, and CARL), her own memory, and scratch
paper, all of which maintain representational state for Joan, the group, or
both. Figure 2 below graphically displays the order of processing of those
memories; it consists largely of transferring information from memory to
3 I’m sorry. Oh what a shame. Well you know, these funny things. (More
officially) What is your employee number?
4 Okay, what I’m going to do is, I’m going to check the, uh, the CARL. Is this
Michelle? Let me check your social security number is the one I have, 1-8-2-
4-zero-7-3-5-5. Okay, what I’m going to do is to check the system and find
out what your coverage is, and if it’s not showing ... coverage on CARL,
uh, then we’ll, hmm, we’ll have to do something else, okay? Hold just a
second, Michelle
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memory in order to answer the query. Within what is so far a very structured
process, Joan’s cognitive work consists largely in knowing which memories to
trigger. Little processing has been done on the actual information.
Although in Figure 2 we present the trajectory that representational states
take through various memories as an individual process, there are actually
multiple group and organizational processes occurring. In distributed cog-
nition theory, expanding the boundaries of the analysis is required as we
enlarge the relevant task in order to understand a memory’s use in its full
organizational context. This will become clearer at the end of the call, when
Joan indexes the call-tracking record and changes the telephone state, but at
this point, Joan is already embedded within these processes. For example,
Joan uses CAT, the call-tracking system, seemingly as a short-term memory
aid. Its major use, however, is to provide other agents with the ability to
reconstruct the history of a caller’s problem. In addition to maintaining a
history of calls for the group, the CAT program also creates transformed,
longer-term memory in the form of statistics, based on the indexing done by
the agent (later) during her wrap-up period. These statistics are used by
management to govern the group’s future behavior, as has been typical in
organizations since the late nineteenth century (Yates, 1989, 1990). The
telephone system, in addition to being a primitive form of group memory
that coordinates and paces the HLG agents’ activities, also creates summary
statistics for the group and the organization as a whole.
To recap, even within these four turns, Joan uses five discrete memories.
Sometimes the memory used is individual and private; sometimes it is group
and public. But all of these memories must be used together seamlessly (or
nearly so) to create an organizational product (the product being not only the
solution to the call but all of the institutional arrangements surrounding it).
The density and connectedness of memories used as resources in this envi-
ronment are remarkable.
The call, of course, continues past Joan’s finding the employee’s record.
Next Joan must determine what to do with the facts she has uncovered.
5.3. HANDLING AN EXCEPTION
As mentioned, Joan pulled up Michelle’s record within the CARL database.
After this, Joan visibly paused and stared at the ceiling. As will be seen
below, Michelle should have EVA coverage according to her CARL record;
 telephone Joan's 
short-term 
CAT  
record paper CARL paper 
Figure 2. The trajectory of representational states through memories in the first 4 turns of Joan’s
call.
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yet, EVA shows no such coverage. Presumably, Joan is trying to figure out
what to do about this unusual discrepancy.
After five seconds, she begins a conversation with one of the senior tele-
phone agents who had been wrapping up her call. In turns 5 through 15, Joan
asks the senior agent, Nichole, how to proceed.
Joan appears in turns 5 through 15 to be trying to understand whether to
escalate the problem to the benefits group. Organizationally, the HRG is
dependent on other groups to handle more complicated or complex situa-
tions; these are called escalations. The senior agent confirms that she should
escalate, and tells her what information is necessary to properly create the
escalation. (In the following, the angle brackets h i indicate a section of the
tape that was indistinct. The slashes \ / and / \ indicate overlapping con-
versational areas on the tape; a ¼ sign indicates that there was no appreciable
pause between the two words.)
Nichole tells Joan, then, to escalate the problem to the Benefits group and
to obtain from EVA what they need to resolve the problem. Joan walks away
from Nichole at the end of this interaction, and returns to her seat.
5 Joan Nikki, can I get your...
6 Nichole Uh, huh. (Nichole nods her head and walks towards
Joan.)
7 Joan If this employee, uh, called EVA and they say they show
no coverage for her, but she’s showing, showing active
on CARL. She’s has confirmed no problems, but what
should I do as far as the referral?
8 Nichole Call, call them [EVA] yourself and find out what they
want.
9 Joan Okay.
10 Nichole Then escalate it to the <Benefits>. EVA is asking for
this information on this <indistinguishable>. (Official
tone, as though acting out a scenario) We show it as
having such-and-such. That way /we\
11 Joan \Okay./ Okay, /I\
12 Nichole \can/ tell <them>... what EVA is looking for.
13 Joan I can tell the employee it’s showing there’s not,
shouldn’t be a problem, so=
14 Nichole =we’re trying to fix it.
15 Joan I’m trying to get a <feel> for it. Thanks, Nik.
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5.4. ORGANIZING THE WORK
We showed earlier how Joan’s processing was dependent on many small
memories, including her own. However, solving a problem may not be
dependent solely on an individual’s cognition and the artifacts (memory or
otherwise) within the immediate environment. These turns show how Joan’s
work is socially organized as well as the role of memory in that organizing.
Unlike ship navigation (Hutchins, 1988, 1995) or air traffic control
(Halverson, 1992, 1994, 1995) with their standard operating procedures,
HLG has fewer pre-specified routines. Yet, as Pentland (1991) observed in his
study of a software hotline and as Katzenberg et al. (1996) observed in
hospital situations, the HLG group has developed a set of informal routines
that can be combined flexibly to solve a large range of problems. Indeed, the
HLG manager repeatedly mentioned during the study that he was trying to
balance flexible diagnosis and service with transaction efficiency. There were
numerous minor task reallocations during the study period as the group
attempted to juggle the two demands and build their repertoire of small
routines.
In this case, Joan has a routine to uncover a discrepancy between what an
employee wishes to have for benefits and what he or she currently has – she
looks it up. Joan can then explain that discrepancy as well as potential
solutions to the employee. The discrepancy, however, between the internal
CyberCorp databases and the benefit provider’s database is not routine. Joan
later demarked the situation as neither usual nor unusual, and as such, one
without a given routine.
Instead, Joan relies on Nichole. Nichole was considered the ‘‘expert’’ on
more obscure situations; HLG agents would often pose difficult questions to
Nichole. Like Hutchins’ Navy navigation crew, the HLG is organized such
that the more senior agents have served in all simpler positions. (The HLG
roles are less differentiated than are those for shipboard navigation, but the
coverage of experts’ knowledge over novices’ tasks is the same.) In addition,
Joan liked asking questions of other agents as a way of obtaining needed
information, so this interaction suited her information seeking style. The
intent of many organizational memory systems would be to replace Nichole
but without losing the supposedly reusable information. Instead, many
exceptions may be better serviced by task experts; as we see here even with
this short exchange.
The production is divided not only among group members but among
groups as well. Relaxing the boundaries of the task shows Joan’s work is also
connected organizationally across other group’s processes. There are two
larger tasks that are invoked in these turns.
First, Joan and HLG are dependent on another organizational group to
maintain the database used to verify an employee’s benefits. Considering the
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call more broadly demonstrates the important set of organizing arrange-
ments required to imbue and inscribe the memory with authenticity and
veracity (Anderson and Sharrock, 1993). The HLG agent relies on the
payroll group for the correctness of the information, when they create and
maintain an employee record, which serves as a boundary object (Star,
1989). Joan knows none of the details of the record’s creation or mainte-
nance; almost all of the context has been lost. She does not know whether
there are problems with the employee’s employment or whether there are
extenuating circumstances. Indeed, it is assumed that the CARL database is
more authoritatively correct than the employee database (maintained by the
accounting department), since CARL is more authoritative for deducted
benefits.
In addition, escalations are problematic organizationally because there is a
fine line between taking action inappropriately or incorrectly and between
wasting the other group’s time. In fact, there was a fair amount of tension
between the Benefits group and HLG. HLG felt that Benefits looked down
on them for not knowing the Human Resources (HR) subject area suffi-
ciently, and HLG agents wished to be regarded as professionals. Indeed,
HLG perceived themselves as the future of the HR profession, as did the
CyberCorp management. But this was a future unwanted by most of Benefits,
since hotline work was perceived by the Benefits professionals as leading to
HR deskilling in CyberCorp. Therefore, inappropriate escalations sometimes
furthered political tensions. Since escalations were always to some extent
problematic, the procedures around them often shifted during the study, thus
the need for the question to Nichole.
5.5. PLAYING A HUNCH
In the next segment of the call, Joan returns to her chair, reconnects her
telephone headset, and begins to speak with Michelle again. Procedurally, all
Joan must do is to tell Michelle that she will call EVA and escalate the
problem. However, this is derailed by a side discussion over Michelle’s
incorrect telephone number.
16 Michelle, when you spoke with the folks at EVA, what, what is it that they
said to you?
17 Okay, because you do in mine. ...So I don’t know what the situation is.
[Segment of the call deleted; Joan is dealing with Michelle’s phone number.]
MARK S. ACKERMAN & CHRISTINE HALVERSON172
In the omitted portion of the transcript, Michelle reports that she cannot
seem to correct her telephone number in the employee phone list, even
though she has tried many times. She discusses this at some length with Joan,
asking her to change it. At first analysis, the incorrect telephone number
appeared to be extraneous to this call, but it is an interesting side conver-
sation. The employee, having found someone to correct her employee re-
cords, now asks Joan to correct her telephone number in all CyberCorp
databases. We believe that to Michelle, it appears that she has found the
person that is in charge of correcting the appropriate memory, whether it is
her telephone number or her benefits status. Joan cannot, because the
responsibility for changing something so seemingly mundane as a telephone
number lies with another group. In the actual production, there are distinct
organizational boundaries to the memories. To the organizational member,
however, these boundaries are arbitrary and frustrating.
Joan continues with her explanation of the escalating process (as it needs
to be seen by the employee). However, this is derailed several times by a side
discussion about obtaining an electronic form for EVA. This side discussion
triggers off a recollection and hunch in Joan.
Finally, Joan ends the call with the employee. Interestingly, Joan has
formulated a plan of action that attempts to solve the problem, rather than
following Nichole’s advice literally. In this, she uses Nichole’s statements as
advice to formulate her own activity, rather than a requirement.
24 Okay, what we’ll do is, I’m going to call EVA (voice rising in question tone)
directly and find out what the situation is, and, uh, it’s possible they might
need some other information that the benefits department can provide for
them, but either way, you’ll get a call back from somebody by the end of the
day tomorrow and let you know what the status is, uh, go ahead...
25 Oh. (surprised) I can request a form for you, but the, the thing is if I request
the form and for some reason they don’t have coverage for you they’re
going to reject it. So what I’ll do is I’ll do two things. Uh, EVA, did you, did
you call the 800 number? Did you call, did the hotline direct you to that
number?
26 Right
27 Oh, I see. Well, you know what? I think I remember this happening once
before, Michelle, and since my system showed that, that the employee that
called was covered, they said, okay, I’ll put that in the system and we’ll go
ahead and send the form out ... so who knows? Did...
[Segment of the call deleted; Joan and Michelle discuss Michelle’s address
for the EVA form.]
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At the end of her conversation with the employee, Joan turns to the
camera and explains the call. In the time that it takes Joan to explain the
situation, she pulls up EVA’s telephone number (using a computerized
rolodex program) and dials the call. In fact, she appears to end her
explanation when the call is connected. In the final section of the call, Joan
convinces the EVA agent that Michelle is a CyberCorp employee and that
she should have EVA benefits. (This has been compressed for space rea-
sons.)
After finishing her call with the EVA agent, Joan wraps up by indexing the
call in the CAT system and then signaling to the phone system that she is
ready for a new call.
At the end of the call, one might surmise that Joan now has a new routine,
calling EVA directly and getting an employee her benefits. She could assume
that this kind of transaction is routine, since the EVA agent treats it as
relatively straightforward. However, as Joan says: ‘‘I think I remember this
happening once before.’’ There is no reason to suppose that this will not be
recreated again from a very hazy human memory.
We next turn to a discussion of the call as a whole and its implications for
organizational memory.
5.6. CONTEXT VS. CONTEXTUALIZING
The term ‘‘context’’ is often used as a catchall to denote the wealth of
organizational and cultural knowledge one effortlessly brings to bear in a
given situation. Joan shows in this call that she has knowledge of how her
world works and that this knowledge is necessary for getting her work done.
Within the call, she displays an understanding of her limitations, the range of
knowledge within HLG, Nichole’s role, and the complex relationship of
HLG to Benefits and to EVA.
If one were primarily interested in implementing a technocentric view of
organizational memory or knowledge management, with their immediate
emphasis on capture and reuse, one might assume that all Joan needs is more
information, whether in a computer system or on paper. Instead, the story is
more complex. We see Joan moving seamlessly through this real setting with
its many process states, using the memories and other artifacts that she
judges to be critical to finishing her task. To understand her use of memory
You don’t [show her on your system]? No. Is it, is it possible for me to, to uh, verify she’s on
our (rising, questioning) system? And you can go ahead and send the form to her? Excellent.
I have an address (rising, questioning), if that would help you?
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resources in accomplishing this, however, it will be important to tease apart
the concurrent use of contextualization, decontextualization, and recontex-
tualization in obtaining a solution to the situation. We do this more fully in
the second call.
5.7. THE MISSING BARK
The need for context, and Joan’s contextualization of the environment, is
revealed in the order and access of various resources. As with Sherlock
Holmes’ famous hound (which remained silent while the supposed crime was
being committed), the interesting thing about this call is all of the things that
did not happen. Joan did not stumble or falter, searching for her next step.
She needed help in the face of a breakdown, but she carefully and quickly
determined a resolution. In her selections, she showed an enormous under-
standing of her environment and the role of artifacts and people within it.
On the other hand, Joan did not use paper or on-line documents to for-
mulate her plan of action for this situation. The key was not that detail was
missing from the on-line sources. If this were so, the solution would be indeed
to add even more information on-line. To the contrary, the key to Joan’s lack
of use is the overwhelming amount of detail available. Since an HLG agent
must have an answer within 45–60 s, it is impossible to sift through mega-
bytes of information. A search with terms ‘‘EVA’’ or ‘‘enrollment’’ might
turn up dozens of documents. Even if the retrieval is ranked (i.e., the search
engine evaluates the likelihood of fit), the agent does not have the time to
consider the retrieved materials.
The information use that does occur is situated (Suchman, 1987). Joan
does not view all sources equally. She went to Nichole, rather than to another
agent. She avoided one database for another. Despite Nichole’s advice, she
relied on her own memory. Like the other agents, Joan considers some
sources as authoritative. Sources have different costs, psychological or
financial, associated with their access. She selects and chooses resources in
her environment, according to her immediate understanding of the situation.
Importantly, the caller, Michelle, does not need to know the space within
Joan is operating. All she needs is her problem solved.
5.8. MEMORIES AS BOUNDARY OBJECTS
In a distributed cognition view, an organization’s memory consists of many
states, instantiated by people and artifacts, all within a single system allowing
the participants to get their work done. As Joan works to solve Michelle’s
problem, we see the process is apparently losing contextual information in
many places – from payroll to HLG, from Nichole to Joan, from HLG to
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Benefits, from Joan to Michelle (in explaining the process), from Joan to the
EVA representative, and finally from Joan to the CAT record.
Some of these differentiations correspond to boundaries with respect to
the propagation of representational state and its re-interpretation. These
boundaries often correspond with organizational divisions. Three of the four
individuals involved in the call are all employees of CyberCorp. However,
their different roles imply different meanings for the same representations.
For the caller Michelle, Joan is the expert at HLG who will solve her
problem. Pushing the notion of social boundaries to its extreme, even though
Joan and Nichole are in the same department, Nichole’s acknowledged
expertise creates a boundary, and thus different contextualizations between
her and Joan. A comparison of these boundaries with the propagation of
representations through the processing of the call illustrates how the cogni-
tion involved (i.e., the use of memory) is constrained by social arrangements.
As representational state propagates across individuals, inter-organiza-
tional, and intra-organizational boundaries, it must necessarily lose some of
its context. As Star (1989) points out, boundary objects in an organization
work because they necessarily contain sufficient detail to be understandable
by both parties, but at the same time, neither party must understand the full
context of use by the other. As boundary objects, artifacts and other po-
tential resources are given to other people or in this case, stored for later use
by others. This requires the information to be decontextualized. Otherwise,
the secondary users will drown in unnecessary, unhelpful, or conflicting data.
(One may also wish to hide or obscure some institutional and social
arrangements from the other group.) As an example, the payroll records are
necessarily standardized and stripped of much informational content before
they can be given to groups such as HLG. Decontextualization, and perhaps
commodification, must be expected by those who will try to use the memory
(Schmidt and Bannon, 1992; Ackerman, 1993).
To reuse a memory, the user must then recontextualize that information
(Carr, 1961; Oakeshott, 1983; Schmidt and Bannon, 1992; Ackerman, 1993).
The information, if not supplied by the same individual, must be reunder-
stood for the user’s current purposes. Elsewhere we have written about the
recontextualization problem in organizational memory systems (Ackerman,
1996), but the call shows that a difficulty, or even outright inability, in re-
contextualization, would make the memory useless or nearly so. For exam-
ple, reused information must be imbued with attributes of veracity,
authenticity, and even status (Anderson and Sharrock, 1993); it must be
provided with everyday organizational context.
Joan understands that the CARL database record is authoritative; she
knows enough of its meaning within HLG’s context. Joan also knows she can
ignore Nichole’s advice, based on her understanding of HLG, Benefits, and
EVA. Rather than adopt Nichole’s advice – find out what EVA wants and
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then escalate – Joan proceeds to convince EVA herself that Michelle is an
employee.
5.9. THE COMPLEXITY OF REUSE
Obviously reuse is possible. Joan’s call showed many memories reused by
Joan, other members of the group, and the organization as a whole. We have
also shown that these memories can be rearranged and reused in different
ways, depending on the production that is required.
The above sections, however, cautioned that the informational require-
ments for reuse are not trivial. For reuse, decontextualized information must
be recontextualized sufficiently by the secondary user, according to his or her
purposes. This is most likely to be done within a familiar process with little
time lapse (Ackerman, 1996). In distributed cognition terms, the cost of reuse
is most likely to be borne where the traffic or the processing utility is highest –
within heavily used or high payoff processes.
The problem with reuse, then, is the coexisting requirement for contex-
tualization, decontextualization and recontextualization. To use information
as a memory, one must remove the detail that provides context, making the
information into a boundary object. However, at the same time one must
consider how others will use it later as a resource in their processes; other-
wise, subsequent users of the memory will not be able to properly recon-
textualize it.
On the other side, based on their understanding of their own situations,
users of a memory must determine what contextual aspects of that memory
are important and whether they have changed. This determination may be
nearly impossible, given people’s limited view of an organization as well as
the decontextualization of the information. Users must then decide how their
differing context should effect their use of the memory, and finally they must
absorb the memory into their current situation. The simpler the memory, the
more likely this all can occur.
5.10. MEMORIES AS PROCESSES
To summarize, we described a benefits verification, one of the simplest
procedures that HLG performs. Yet, this simple procedure exposed a num-
ber of interesting aspects of organizational memory (Table I). The procedure
involved nine different memories, and the human agent involved either
translated among representational states or reconstructed memory states. We
also noted that this process was simultaneously embedded within several
short-term and long-term memory processes (such as the formation of suit-
able group statistics and a call-history).
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Perhaps most importantly, memories had mixed provenance. They were
sometimes the provenance of the individual (e.g., Joan’s scratch notes) or the
group (e.g., the call-handling procedure embedded in the telephone system).
But, often enough, the memory that served Joan as individual memory also
had a definition as a group and even an organizational memory. The call-
tracking record, for example, was used by Joan to aid her short-term mem-
ory, by the group to reconstruct a call-history, and by the organization to
monitor the activities of the group.
We also noted the importance of boundary objects and recontextualization
in this analysis. In this verification call, the recontextualization was relatively
straightforward. In the next situation, however, Joan must deal with an
exceptional call, one that clearly involves breakdowns. This next situation
more clearly delineates what we see as the critical issues in recontextualiza-
tion, namely trajectories and their projected consequences.
6. Re-reading the record
The second situation (below) involves re-reading a previously created call
record. The situation spans a number of hours, and we present only portions
of the transcript here.
The ‘‘COBRA man’’, as Joan labels him in the call, had called earlier
in the day, checking his coverage. In the U.S. companies are required to
provide medical insurance for laid-off employees for one year. The law is
called COBRA, and at CyberCorp the medical insurance was called
‘‘COBRA benefits’’ or simply ‘‘COBRA’’. For the ex-employee to obtain
his COBRA benefits, he had to periodically send in checks to Cyber-
Corp. The ex-employee called to determine whether his current check had
been received, because he had already had a problem with an earlier
payment. The CyberCorp record, a spreadsheet, did not show his current
payment. The ex-employee then pointed out to Joan that this had hap-
pened before, and at the time, he had been found to be fully paid. He
therefore asked whether this could have happened again. Joan said she
would investigate.
Table I. Nine distinct memories used in the first call (types of memories)
Technical systems Databases Human Other
CARL Employee phone list Joan’s memory Paper
Phone system Computerized Rolodex Nichole’s memory
CAll Tracking System Benefit providers database
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As part of her investigation, Joan looked at the earlier CAT records for
this ex-employee. As mentioned, the CAT system allows an agent to pull up
previous call records for a caller. Generally, this was used as a group memory
of previous calls on a problem. Occasionally, the CAT records were used
across problems to consider the history of a caller, especially one with an
organizationally problematic situation. For example, one such call involved a
caller who was trying to weasel an extension to his short-term disability. In
the case of the COBRA man, Joan tried to use the previous CAT records to
shed some light on his reliability and his current problem. Unfortunately, the
earlier CAT records were not sufficiently complete – the ex-employee was
providing details that were not in the record.
In the following exchange, Joan double-checks with Lisa about one of the
calls, one that occurred three months earlier. Because of the conversation’s
length, we include only excerpts here.
Joan begins by restarting the COBRA conversation as Lisa is about to
leave for the day. Joan briefly describes the situation and what she can
reconstruct of the previous call. Lisa initially says rather sharply that she
remembers nothing of the call. Nonetheless, in turn 4 she offers to look at the
call record, and by turn 8, she is engaged in the problem.
While Lisa reads her record, Joan provides a description of the caller’s
state-of-mind. Lisa’s actions cannot be determined from the video, but
during this period, there are conversational cues that she is reading her CAT
record. She does not provide any cues that she remembers very much, if
anything. Joan continues to describe the ex-employee’s comments:
The description in turn 21 seems to trigger Lisa’s recollection. As the rec-
ollection continues in turns 26 through 38, Joan and Lisa show many
21 Joan And, you know, the feeling that nothing is happening for
him. So he says, so, what if I get hit by a truck when I go
outside and I don’t have coverage? What’s going to happen
to me?
7 Joan I’ve got the calls. There are like four COBRA calls, so I’ve
got the, uh, …, uh the serial numbers.
8 Lisa Give me mine. (helpfully) It might ring a bell.
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conversational signs, such as overlapping speech, that they are now acting in
concert. In turns 26 through 34, Lisa provides the memory that a person from
the Benefits group came down to Lisa’s cubicle with the ex-employee’s file.
Together they determined that there had been an error: The payment had
been logged incorrectly. (There is a hint in turn 28’s intonation that the
Benefits person might have brought the file down with the intention of
proving the ex-employee wrong, but had been proven mistaken herself by
Lisa.)
Joan declares in turn 35 that she will go ahead and send the problem on to
Benefits as an ‘‘escalation’’. As before, inappropriate escalations sometimes
furthered political tensions. Since escalations were always to some extent
problematic, Joan and HLG felt the necessity to confirm the details of a
problem before sending it on to Benefits.
Through this exchange, Joan recovered critical details of the previous call.
The ex-employee was providing an accurate account. By checking into the
record, Joan determined that he was probably telling the truth about the
current situation. More importantly, Joan recovered key contextual infor-
mation about Benefit’s analysis of the situation. In order to accurately weigh
the evidence to be presented in the escalation, the CAT record, being
incomplete, needed extraordinary recontextualization.
Of course, if the record had been available only as a decontextualized
object, it may have been possible for the escalation to succeed. However, one
26 Lisa \I actually do remember that./ I remember she had his file. She
brought it down=
27 Joan (agreeing) =mm-hm
28 Lisa and she went (quickly, mock tone) oops (normal voice), it got
logged wrong. He is paid.
29 Joan Okay.
30 Lisa Yeah it was our error…
31 Joan Yeah.
32 Lisa Not ours, but it’s their error in logging it. They didn’t log it in…
33 Joan Well… (Joan starts to put away a cup on her desk)
34 Lisa When they received it.
35 Joan I’m going to go ahead and…and do the escalation. I didn’t think
that you’d have any impact to the call. That’s fine. I was just
wondering because he’s said=
36 Lisa =I know that CyberCorp had made an error there
37 Joan /Um, okay\
38 Lisa \At the ti/me
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can easily imagine that extra work (if not the repeat of the diagnostic effort)
would have been required by the organization. Nonetheless, one might
wonder why so little was written in the CAT record.
6.1. TRAJECTORIES AND THE MEMORY PROCESS
…consider the cognitive properties of the team as a whole. …It is not the
case that two or more heads are always better than one. (Hutchins, 1995, p.
xvi)
Lisa chose to write up a terse CAT record on the previous call, necessitating
Joan’s extraordinary recontextualization. Agents wrote very short, terse CAT
records when they felt that no one would later need the record. For example,
the CAT record where a caller verifies that a person is a CyberCorp employee
(e.g., for a mortgage application) might be a single line, if the agent even
wrote a record. Employee verifications were not revisited.
In Lisa’s call, she assumed that she should hurry through the write-up.
HLG gets rewarded for fast wrap-ups, and avoiding copious notes for all
calls is required. The ex-employee’s payment had been found, the logging
corrected, and the problem rectified. The trajectory of future use appeared to
be obvious.
Trajectory (Strauss, 1993; Hutchins, 1995) describes the path of an event;
in this case, we mean it to be the likely trajectory as anticipated. Strauss
(1993) explains trajectory by using the example from medical diagnosis: The
treatment of a fever is dependent on its anticipated trajectory. Treatment of a
simple fever for a healthy 25-year-old male is quite different than that for an
HIV-positive male. The anticipated trajectory of a situation is often critical to
organizational processes and is usually based on trajectories of past experi-
ence – what Hutchins calls developmental trajectory. Past experience in the
development of the practice, the practitioners and the conduct of the activity
affect the present of the activity.
The incentives for keeping memory follow the developmental trajectory,
the assumed trajectory, and its projected consequences. In this case, Lisa
assumed that the call would never be referenced again; she had little incentive
to write a complete call record. Joan had to deal with the unanticipated (and
perhaps unanticipatable) consequences of Lisa’s projecting the trajectory
incorrectly.
One can perhaps see this even more clearly in Joan’s escalation of the
problem. She must weigh the event’s trajectory and projected consequences
to create a correctly formed escalation. As mentioned, she must now escalate
the problem to the Benefits group; she must therefore create a boundary
object. Slightly over 20 min after her conversation with Lisa, Joan begins to
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rewrite the CAT record for the current call; this will also be sent to Benefits as
the escalation record. The trajectory is now that the CAT record will be
reused as a boundary object, so that Benefits can understand the problem.
In a lengthy aside to the observer as she prepared the escalation, Joan
pointed out the facets of ‘‘appropriate’’ escalation for this case. Clearly part
of what Joan must do is to lay out the ‘‘facts’’ of the case. Initially, this is
what she traces through as she describes the process of creating an escalation.
She has verified that the COBRA man is providing accurate details, and she
states this is important.
She [Lisa] did give me good information because, um, he, the employee had
told me that he had called before and spoken with Lisa and, um. (pause)
The Benefits specialist came down, and said well, I know, he’s covered. […]
So that is, uh, something I can put in this call…
She goes on to say that she needs to suggest to Benefits that the ex-employee
may be correct.
Lisa’s given me information I can share with Sally [a Benefits person]
saying, I’ve spoken to Lisa and she said yeah, it was logged wrong, and you
know, you have his file. Is this possible … that this has happened again, or
what is the situation.
So far, she is merely detailing the ‘‘facts’’ as she has uncovered them.
However, Joan then continues her comment by explaining why she is
spending so much time creating the appropriate escalation record. A con-
siderable amount of time is spent removing extraneous detail from the CAT
record. She tells the camera that she must pick her facts with care, removing
extraneous detail (i.e., decontextualizing the actual record) and double-
checking any detail that remains.
A lot of this information I just take as I’m writing, as I’m, um, taking the
call, and it’s not just pertinent information to share with the Benefits folk,
but that’s, you know, having to go back and just kinda clean up the call
before we send it over…as an escalation.
6.2. OBJECTS IN PROCESSES AND PROCESSES IN OBJECTS
Joan edits and re-edits the CAT record for the escalation. While this is partly
a result of Joan’s inexperience with COBRA benefits, the following suggests
that she is also rewriting the record to cover any uncertainty or incompetency
as well:
Part of the amount of time it takes is really making sure that the
information we’re sending over is really accurate and … when there are
MARK S. ACKERMAN & CHRISTINE HALVERSON182
um, areas, like, I don’t live and breathe COBRA information, so what
might be important, what I might think is important information, might be
nothing to them.
As Joan traces through what makes an appropriate escalation record, her
explanation begins to deviate from merely detailing the facts. The escalation
record will go to Benefits, as discussed above, a group with which HLG has
had problematic relations. Indeed, it may become part of the evidence in any
later status conflicts. This escalation record, then, serves as part of HLG’s
organizational ‘‘face’’.
Joan points out to the camera that a proper escalation must be complete
and accurate – in a word, what Benefits requires and nothing more. This
CAT record, and Joan’s anticipated consequence, is that the record will be
thoroughly scrutinized by Joan’s supervisor and by some part of Benefits.
Both will judge the record’s quality. (Joan was seen as a good employee by
her supervisors, although she was unsure why she had not been promoted to
supervisory status herself. We have already described Benefits’ interactions
with the HLG.)
One of the supervisors, um, will check and make sure it’s accurate
information and the call notes are complete. And she’ll say did you check,
you know, the system, or did you check this out.
Presumably this judgment will be part of future interactions between Joan
and her supervisor as well as HLG and Benefits. In a sense, then, a boundary
object is only partially an ‘‘object’’. It is also an event in many different
organizational processes. Later boundary objects (and possibly previous
objects) will be understood in light of this particular boundary object and its
implications. An organizational member’s assumptions about anticipated
consequences and potential trajectories will include not only the current
situation, but future situations as well.
In summary, this situation shows that raw CAT records are hardly useful.
They can jog an individual’s memory, but we saw that Lisa needed additional
cues to actually recover her memory. They can serve as a group memory, but
Joan could not adequately recontextualize Lisa’s record. Finally, the CAT
records can serve as boundary objects between groups, but this can take
considerable work.
Obviously, not all attempts to reuse CAT records were failures. Most
reuse appeared effortless and seamless. This example, however, highlights the
everyday work that must be done to make reuse appear effortless in its
success. Much of that work involves being able to properly recontextualize a
record, given that the person who created it properly understood its later
reuse. In other words, later recontextualization succeeds or suffers from
earlier assumptions about the record’s trajectory.
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7. Conclusions
This study has many limitations. As with many ethnographies, the repre-
sentativeness of HLG and its activities could be argued. We have been able to
present only a few simple cases here. Yet, within these limits, we have tried to
show that:
• There is no such thing as an organizational memory per se, as the
organizational memory metaphor attempts to invoke. We have tried to
detail how a supra-individual memory works in its use of multiple people
and many artifacts. Our analysis also demonstrated the utility of dis-
tributed cognition theory in understanding such a supra-individual
memory.
These simple calls and their distributed cognition analysis exposed a number
of interesting aspects of this organization’s memory at a micro-level. We also
showed how:
• The benefits verification procedure involved nine at least different
memory states and the human agent involved either translated among
representational states or reconstructed memory states.
• Even this simple procedure was a complex case of distributed memory.
Memories were complexly distributed, interwoven, and occasionally
overlaid. They had a mixed provenance. Sometimes they belonged to the
individual (e.g., Joan’s scratch notes) or the group (e.g., the call-handling
procedure embedded in the telephone system). But, often enough, the
memory that served as individual memory also had a definition as a
group and even an organizational memory.
• While knowledge management largely restricts itself to viewing organi-
zational memory as repositories of experience ‘‘objects’’ that are magi-
cally reusable, we have tried to show that it is more fruitful to consider
organizational memory as both object and process. Memory is both an
artifact that holds its state and an artifact that is simultaneously embedded
in many organizational and individual processes.
• The container metaphor is easier to consider computationally, but it is
extremely limited organizationally. The distributed cognition view of a
network of artifacts and people, of memory and of processing, bound by
social arrangements, provides a deeper and ultimately more usable
understanding of organizational life. It describes how memory as rep-
resentational states can be both separated from organizational actors,
and is at the same time, necessarily bound to their actions and under-
standings.
• The second call highlighted the issues of decontextualization and recon-
textualization that are required to effectively turn a memory ‘‘object’’ into
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a memory process. As memory crosses between groups or even across
time, it becomes a boundary object, attempting to serve the needs of both
creator and reader but lacking the full context of either. To properly serve
the reader or re-user of the memory, the creator must properly project the
consequences of the memory’s later use, or trajectory. This can be a dif-
ficult matter, although people do it everyday in their work.
This paper has highlighted many of the issues and problems in creating
memories that are used and are found usable by groups and organizations.
We have also proposed a number of theoretical concepts (Strauss, 1991) –
distributed memories, simultaneous embedment, mixed provenance, bound-
ary objects, recontextualization, and trajectory – that enabled us to analyze
the use of memory in these calls.
However, we have seen, even in these examples, that memories do get
created and reused. More work will be required to examine the details of how
work activities evolve memories. Our current work examines how memories
evolve, becoming resources in similar complex environments. We are also
examining how much memories are maintained and reused over time.
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Notes
1 An earlier version of this theoretical description was published in Communications of the
ACM (Ackerman and Halverson, 2000). The earlier version was substantially less complete
(less than one-third this length) and designed for a popular audience.
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2 We note the difference between empirical and empiricist studies. We are calling for empir-
ically-grounded, interpretivist studies to define organizational memory.
3 ‘‘The basic procedures of navigation are accomplished by a cycle of activity, called the fix
cycle, in which representations of the spatial relationship of the ship to known landmarks
are created, transformed, and combined in such a way that the solution to the problem of
position fixing is transparent.’’ (Hutchins, 1995, p. 117)
4 All participants and their individual attributes have been disguised for publication.
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